Guided by the APA Ethics Code and social justice, this book helps psychologists solve ethical dilemmas while empowering those impacted by their work.

O’Donohue has identified 37 criticisms of the American Psychological Association’s Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (Ethics Code), although many of his criticisms go far beyond what is found written in the APA Ethics Code, to include the process of adjudicating ethics complaints by the American Psychological Association Ethics Committee, and the process by which the Ethics Code was developed. The authors claim that a major shortcoming of O’Donohue’s article is that he adopted an unrealistically expansive role for (...) the Ethics Code that was not clearly linked to furthering the goals of the ethics code revision. (shrink)

Out of a concern for keeping suicidal patients alive, some psychotherapists may use hard persuasion or coercion to keep them in treatment. However, more recent evidence-supported interventions have made respect for patient autonomy a cornerstone, showing that the effective interventions that promote the wellbeing of suicidal patients also prioritize respect for patient autonomy. This article details how psychotherapists can incorporate respect for patient autonomy in the effective treatment of suicidal patients by listening to them, explaining treatments to them, involving them (...) in decisions, and inviting evaluations from them on the process and progress of their treatment. It also describes how processes that respect patient autonomy can supplement interventions that directly address some of the drivers of suicide. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The authors argue that individual psychologists have an obligation to understand, review, and comment on upcoming revisions of the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct. Psychologists may want to consider several factors as they review and prepare comments on these revisions. Among other things, commenting psychologists should consider the purposes of ethics codes and how the writing of a code can meet or balance these often-conflicting purposes; the overarching ethical theory or theories that should form the basis (...) of the APA Ethics Code; and the extent to which individual standards are useful and comprehensive, and avoid unnecessary harm to both the public and psychologists. The authors provide examples from the current and recent APA Ethics Codes to illustrate the types of decisions that psychologists must make when evaluating revisions to the APA Ethics Code. (shrink)

New and experienced psychotherapists alike can find themselves overwhelmed by an ethical quandary where there doesn't seem to be an easy solution. This book presents positive ethics as a means to overcome such ethical challenges. The positive approach focuses on not just avoiding negative consequences, but reaching the best possible outcomes for both the psychotherapist and the client. The authors outline a clear decision-making process that is based on three practical strategies: the ethics acculturation model to help therapists incorporate personal (...) ethics into their professional roles, the quality enhancement model for dealing with high-risk patients who are potentially harmful, and ethical choice-making strategies to make the most ethical decision in a situation where two ethical principles conflict. Throughout the decision-making process, psychotherapists are encouraged to follow four basic guidelines: Focus on overarching ethical principles Consider intuitive, emotional, and other nonrational factors Accept that some problems have elusive solutions Solicit input from colleagues and consultation groups Numerous vignettes illustrate how to apply positive ethics to many different ethical challenges that psychotherapists will likely encounter in practice. (shrink)

Continuing professional education in ethics for psychologists is becoming more common, as psychology licensing boards in 14 states now require continuing education in ethics as a condition of licensure renewal. This article suggests ways to improve the quality of ethics continuing education by diversifying the content and teaching methods.

RésuméDans l'article qui précède, l'auteur s'efforce, à l'intention surtout de ceux qui enseignent les Eléments, de mettre en lumière la signification et l'importance de deux ouvrages concernant la géométrie. Le court écrit de M. G. Bouligand fait apparaǐtre la structure algébrique et logique de cette science et présente une ȧxiomatique introduisant les notions d'ensemble et de groupe de transformation. Ainsi s'élabore une classification progressive des problèmes selon le genre des solutions qui leur conviennent. Le livre beaucoup plus étendu de M. (...) F. Gonseth analyse les aspects intuitif, expérimental et théorique de ce qui constituait l'élémentaire dans les traités classiques, puis expose les recherches suscitées par le postulat d'Euclide qui ont amené au développement de la méthode axiomatique. Le triomphe de l'atomisme, découvrant un monde où les notions élémentaires de la géométrie ne s'applíquent plus intégralement, vient rendre plus aigu encore le problème du fondement de la vérité géométrique et celui de la nature de l'espace. Grǎce à l'introduction de notions telles que celle de correspondance schématique et celle de modèle, la géométrie apparaǐt comme une science rationnelle en évolution et à laquelle l'axiomatique sert de critère. Mais bien loin de présenter les caractères d'une pure rationalité, cette axiomatique retient certaines données intuitives, měme dans son application aux géométries non euclidiennes; elle organise un contrǒle de nos intuitions les plus élémentaires les unes par les autres, et assure par leur intermédiaire la portée expérimentale et la cohérence de la géométrie. On assiste ainsi à une véritable mutation de l'élémentaire; mais celle‐ci n'est pas due au hasard. La méthode qui a présidé à cette transformation, dont les étapes historiques sont décrites, est clairement dégagée et il est visible qu'elle régit également les formes nouvelles de la physique dont la constitution théorique ne diffère pas essentiellement de la géométrie considérée comme la science rationnelle de l'espace. Cette méthode est le statut d'une science ouverte. Ainsi se trouve pleinement légitimé un exposé comme celui de M. Bouligand. En s'illustrant l'un l'autre, les deux ouvrages offrent des horizons nouveaux à l'enseignement, měme élémentaire, de la géométrie. La portée philosophique de ces ouvrages n'est pas moindre que leur portée pédagogique.ZusammenfassungIn der voranstehenden Besprechung möchte der Rezensent insbesondere diejenigen unter den Lesern, die die Elemente unterrichten, auf zwei bedeutende Geometriewerke hinweisen. G. Bouligands knapp gehaltene Schrift stellt den algebraisch‐logischen Aufbau dieser Wissenschaft ins Licht und bietet eine Axiomatik, die die Begriffe der Menge und der Transformations‐gruppe einführt. Ausgehend von der passenden Lösungsart gelangt der Verfasser zu einer fortschreitenden Klassifizierung der Aufgaben. In seinem viel breiter angelegten Werk untersucht F. Gonseth das in den klassischen Lehrbüchern als das Elementare angesehene vom intuitiven, experimentellen und theoretischen Gesichtspunkte aus und macht daran anschliessend mit den von Euklids Postulat ausgehenden Nachforschungen, die zur Entwicklung der axiomatischen Methode geführt haben, bekannt. Der eigentliche Siegeszug des Atomismus und die mit dieser Wissenschaft verbundene Entdeckung einer Welt, in der die grundsätzlichen Begriffe der Geometrie ihre volle Bestätigung nicht mehr erfahren, macht die Frage nach den Grundlagen der Geometrie und die nach dem Wesen des Raums besonders brennend. Die Einführung von Begriffen wie Schema und Modell lässt die Geometrie als eine in Entwicklung begriffene Rationalwissenschaft erscheinen, welcher die Axiomatik als Prüfstein dient. Letztere trägt aber durchaus nicht die Züge reiner Vernunftmässigkeit, sie hält vielmehr, selbst in ihrer Anwendung auf die nichteuklidischen Geometrien, an gewissen intuitiven Voraussetzungen fest; sie ermöglicht eine wechselseitige Kritik unserer elementarsten intuitiven Erkenntnisse unter sich und gewährleistet so die experimentelle Tragweite und die Kohärenz der Geometrie. Es findet also eine eigentliche Mutation des Elementaren statt, doch bleibt dieser Wandel nicht dem Zufall überlassen. Die Planmässigkeit, mit der er sich vollzog, wird unter Beschreibung der geschichtlichen Entwicklungsstufen klar dargelegt, womit erkennbar wird, dass er auch die neueren Formen der Physik bestimmt, die sich ja nach ihrem theoretischen Grundgesetz von der Geometrie als der rationalen Wissenschaft vom Raume nicht wesentlich unterscheidet. Eine solche Methode erfüllt das Lebensgesetz einer offenen Wissenschaft. Durch sie finden Ausführungen wie die Bouligands ihre volle Rechtfertigung. Sich gegenseitig ergänzend und erläuternd eröffnen beide Werke selbst dem Elementarunterricht in der Geometrie neue Möglichkeiten. Der pädagogischen kommt ihre philosophische Bedeutung gleich.In the foregoing article the author endeavours—especially for all who are teaching the Elements—to set forth the significance and importance of two books about geometry. Mr. G. Bouligand's short writing brings out the algebraic and logical structure of that science and presents an »axiomatic« introducing both the notions of »whole« and »group of transformation«. A progressive classification of problems is thus elaborated according to the kinds of solutions that suit them. Mr. F. Gonseth, in his far more comprehensive work, analyses the intuitive, experimental and theoretical aspects of what used to constitute the elementary in classical treatises, then states the researches raised up by Euclid's postulate and leading to the development of the axiomatic method. The triumph of atomism, discovering a world to which the elementary notions of geometry do no longer apply fully, makes it still more difficult to solve the problems of the basing of both geometrical truth and the nature of space. Thanks to his introducing such ideas as »schematic correspondence« and »model«, geometry appears as a rational science in progress using the »axiomatic« as its criterion. But far from offering the characteristics of pure rationality, such an »axiomatic« retains some intuitive bases, even when applied to non‐Euclidian geometries; it organizes a control of our most elementary intuitions by setting them against one another, and secures through their medium the experimental significance and coherence of geometry. Thus a real mutation of the elementary takes place; but it is not owing to mere chance. The method which has presided over that transformation, the historical changes and stages of which are described, is clearly shown, and it is made evident that it also determines the new forms of physics, the theoretical constitution of which does not differ essentially from geometry considered as the rational science of space. That method is the statute of an open science. So Mr. Bouligand's account is fully justified. By elucidating each other, both books open new horizons to the teaching—even elementary—of geometry. The philosophical significance of those books is of no less importance than the pedagogical one. (shrink)

Presents a penetrating study of Eliot's Four Quartets. Begins with an account of the intellectual and personal context for Eliot's mature work, explaining how his influences shaped his mind, then discusses Eliot's own personal circumstances and the contemporary relevance of his work a half century after it appeared, offering comparisons with Samuel Beckett. A central motif of analysis of "Burnt Norton" is Augustine's discussion of time in relation to subjective memory. Other literary references brought to bear (...) on the Four Quartets include work by Yeats, Milton, and St. John of the Cross, as well as the Bible and the Bhagavad-Gita. Warner is a senior lecturer in philosophy at the University of Warwick, UK. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

Foreward by Pramod K. Nayar -- Prologue -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- The dys-abled players of Samuel Beckett's Endgame -- The circumcised body of Franz Kafka's select letters -- 'Connoisseurship ... of disease' and Thomas Mann's Death in Venice -- 'Undiscovered countries' with Virginia Woolf's On being ill -- 'Connect nothing with nothing' in T.S. Eliot's The wasteland -- Epilogue -- Pathography -- Index.

Discusses philosophers such as John Burke, John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, Fisher Ames, Sir Walter Scott, George Canning, John C. Calhoun, John Marshall, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, John Randolph, James Fenimore Cooper, Tocqueville, John Quincy Adams, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Benjamin Disraeli, Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, James Russell Lowell, Henry Adams, George Gissing, Arthur Balfour, W.H. Mallock, Irving Babbitt, Paul Elmer More, George Santayana, Sir Henry Maine, and others.

This paper is an attempt to lay out a meta‐ethical position that is inspired by the framework of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. To achieve this goal, this paper is divided into two parts. First, I explore recent attempts to tie Wittgenstein's epistemology in On Certainty to moral epistemology. I argue that there can be a meaningful parallel drawn between the epistemic certainties discussed in On Certainty and what I consider to be moral certainties. These moral certainties are unjustified fundamental moral attitudes (...) that underlie our moral practices. Then, I show how the debate over moral certainty has branched into two directions. One direction presents the concept of moral certainty as a naturalistic concept. On this reading, moral certainties transcend time and place since they are rooted in our natural tendencies to act or not act in certain ways. The other direction presents moral certainty as a distinctly relativistic concept. On this reading, we have our moral certainties because we belong to communities that agree on these certainties. In the second section, I argue that we have both natural, universal certainties and localized, relative certainties. I also argue that our localized certainties are constrained by non‐moral facts about ourselves and about the world. To make this argument, I rely on Wittgenstein's concept of “general facts of nature.” The result of the paper is a meta‐ethical position that can be located in between moral relativism and moral realism. (shrink)

Modernists T. S. Eliot's and W. B. Yeats's treatment of the transcendent moment, and postmodernists Samuel Beckett's and Graham Swift's handling of the perpetual present form two conflicting time worlds. The modernists' transcendent moment signifies a temporary release from the progressive stream of time. As a sudden flash of awareness, it offers a transcendental vision of reality. Contrariwise, the postmodernists' perpetual present is cut off from the past as well as the future, suggesting the infinite time of the (...) middle. It is dissociated from a transcendent reality and has no room for revelatory moments, which establishes its bleak character. (shrink)

This paper shows that Hannah Arendt was a theorist both of secularization as a process and the secular as a goal of modern politics. It reconstructs these arguments in her corpus, especially her book "On Revolution," and argues that this dimension of her work may have been a response to Carl Schmitt (and is in any event now usefully read in such a way). The paper ends by examining how Arendt might reply to currently influential challengers of a secular politics.

In Book II, Chapter xxi of An essay concerning human understanding, Locke claims that a mind's will is its power 'to order the consideration of any Idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versa in any particular instance' (Il. xxi. 5).l To exercise this power (that is, to will), Locke says, is to perform an act of volition (or: willing), volitions being actions of the (...) mind directed to the performance of other actions (of the mind or body). Locke claims further that a man's being free (or at liberty) with respect to some action A is his having the power to perform or to forbear performing A according to his volition in the matter (8). Thus, X is free with respect to A if and onty if (i) X is able to perform A if he wills to perform A and (ii) X is able not to perform A if he wills not to perform A. This analysis of freedom. (shrink)

Marxism has often been associated with two different legacies. The first rests on a strong exposition and critique of the logic of capitalism, grounded in a systematic analysis of the laws of motion of capitalism as a system. The second legacy refers to a strong historicist perspective grounded in a conception of social relations that emphasises the centrality of power and social conflict to the analysis of history. This article challenges the prominence of structural accounts of capitalism by showing how (...) the tension between these legacies has played out within Political Marxism, both orientations already having co-existed, somewhat uneasily, within Robert Brenner’s original contributions to the Transition Debate. Through this internal critique and re-formulation of Political Marxism, we wish to open a broader debate within Marxism on the need for a more agency-based account of capitalism, which builds more explicitly on the concept of social relations, to recover the historicist legacy of Marxism. (shrink)

I argue that Spinoza endorses "conceptual dependence monism," the thesis that all forms of metaphysical dependence (such as causation, inherence, and existential dependence) are conceptual in kind. In the course of explaining the view, I further argue that it is actually presupposed in the proof for his more famed substance monism. Conceptual dependence monism also illuminates several of Spinoza’s most striking metaphysical views, including the intensionality of causal contexts, parallelism, metaphysical perfection, and explanatory rationalism. I also argue that this priority (...) of the conceptual does not commit Spinoza to forms of idealism or mentalism. The question of how to understand different kinds of metaphysical dependence is quite controversial in Spinoza studies; I address major alternative readings in the notes. But there I also try to draw connections to the growing debate in contemporary discussions about metaphysical dependence, as this topic is a happy point of shared interest between Spinoza and contemporary metaphysicians alike. (shrink)

Liberalism and Distributive Justice discusses liberalism, capitalism, distributive justice, and John Rawls's difference principle. Chapters are organized in a narrative arc: from liberalism as the dominant political and economic system, to the laws governing interpersonal transactions in liberal society, to basic economic and political institutions that determine distributive justice.

Can quantum theory provide examples of metaphysical indeterminacy, indeterminacy that obtains in the world itself, independently of how one represents the world in language or thought? We provide a positive answer assuming just one constraint of orthodox quantum theory: the eigenstate-eigenvalue link. Our account adds a modal condition to preclude spurious indeterminacy in the presence of superselection sectors. No other extant account of metaphysical indeterminacy in quantum theory meets these demands.

Understanding inductive reasoning is a problem that has engaged mankind for thousands of years. This problem is relevant to a wide range of fields and is integral to the philosophy of science. It has been tackled by many great minds ranging from philosophers to scientists to mathematicians, and more recently computer scientists. In this article we argue the case for Solomonoff Induction, a formal inductive framework which combines algorithmic information theory with the Bayesian framework. Although it achieves excellent theoretical results (...) and is based on solid philosophical foundations, the requisite technical knowledge necessary for understanding this framework has caused it to remain largely unknown and unappreciated in the wider scientific community. The main contribution of this article is to convey Solomonoff induction and its related concepts in a generally accessible form with the aim of bridging this current technical gap. In the process we examine the major historical contributions that have led to the formulation of Solomonoff Induction as well as criticisms of Solomonoff and induction in general. In particular we examine how Solomonoff induction addresses many issues that have plagued other inductive systems, such as the black ravens paradox and the confirmation problem, and compare this approach with other recent approaches. (shrink)

Chapter 1 Introduction How are participants associated with the eventualities they participate in? Are there events? Thematic roles? ...

I argue that the paradoxes attributed to the Megarians, namely the Liar, the Sorites, presupposition ("Have you stopped beating your father,") and failure of substitution of co-referential terms in psychological verbs ("The Electra") were intended to be reasons to accept Parmenides view that non-being is an incoherent notion and that there is exactly One Being. That is, Eubulides and others were akin to Zeno, in indirectly supporting Parmenidean monism.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ronald Shusterman IN DEFENSE OF ELITISM I One recent trend in criticism, starting notably widi die work of Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels,1 has suggested diat literary theory is either useless, harmful, or bodi. This pragmatist line ofargument can be seen to go hand in hand widi contemporary attacks on the distinction between "high" and "low" art, claiming that a rap text deserves die same attention or (...) esteem as a poem by Eliot. My purposes here are predetermined by die polemical nature of this debate. I shall endeavor to show diat tiieory is useful and diat diere is a valid distinction between low and high. I intend to do so, somewhat negatively, notby giving examples—diough diis would be easy enough— but rather by underlining die contradictions inherent in some of these arguments. I shall also deal widi anodier debate, which may at first appear unrelated, concerning die limits of interpretation. I diink it can be noted that the criteria of judgment involved in distinguishing between high and low are connected to die criteria of interpretation which, though diey do not close die open work, do permit the identification of misreadings. If judgment involves refined analysis, then theory is necessary as an instrument of refinement. If misreadings exist, dien absolute interpretive relativism cannot be justified. One might expect me to begin by defining "literary tiieory," but one of my main points is that such a definition is futile. The dieoretical endeavor is myriad. The term theory can be fruitfully used to designate a wide continuum of discourses about literature diat range from pure explication to pure philosophy. I see no need to find a common denominator diat would bring togedier under a single description narratology, stylistics, deconstructionist criticism, and so on. Philosophy and Literature, © 1994, 18: 242-252 Ronald Shusterman243 Indeed, in dieir original attack on literary theory, Knapp and Michaels were careful to set aside the more "empirical" approaches such as narratology as not relevant to their criticisms (p. 11). Their basic complaint has to do widi theories of interpretation, and they conclude:... theory is nothing else but the attempt to escape practice... theory is notjust another name for practice. It is the name for all the ways people have tried to stand outside practice in order to govern practice from without. Our thesis has been that no one can reach a position outside practice, that theorists should stop trying, and that the theoretical enterprise should therefore come to an end. (p. 30) The point seems to be that criticism, as a practice, can and must be undertaken widiout die interference of a supposed realm of independent principles or axioms. That was ten years ago. Joel Weinsheimer has recently defended similar conclusions in an article entitled "Suppose Theory Is Dead."2 He invokes Gadamer to argue diat "understanding can and does succeed even widiout die imprimatur of theoretical self-consciousness" (p. 252). Weinsheimer refuses what he sees as the "first principle of the first theorist of literature: that only theory counts as knowledge" (p. 263). This, of course, echoes pragmatist philosophy's new emphasis on praxis as a valid form of knowledge: The kind of knowledge involved in acting or story-telling or teaching or practical criticism is practical knowledge, and if it cannot satisfactorily explain orjustify from principles what it practices, that is not its fault but its nature—even its particular significance.... Literature is to be practiced, is the practice of it, its own practice, and in this light at least theory is merely the self-defeating attempt to abstract literature from its presentations, from the concrete practice diat is itself. (Weinsheimer, p. 263) To those who would argue that any practice presupposes theoretical principles, Weinsheimer retorts that such presuppositions need not be considered as tiieory: "Interpretation supposes a form of life, perhaps, but a form of life is not a theory" (p. 255). I admit to being somewhat confused when he writes that practical criticism "involves tacit knowledge, certainly, but such knowledge is not necessarily dieoretical" (p. 255). I do not think diat what we do when 244Philosophy and Literature reading critically can be assimilated to what we do when, say, riding a bicycle... (shrink)

I THE REHABILITATION OF RHETORIC The ancients denned rhetoric as the art of speaking and writing both well and convincingly: ars bene dicendi and ars ...

In recent scholarship, the science and religion debate has been historicized, revealing the novelty of the concepts of science and religion and their complex connections to secularization and the birth of modernity. This article situates this historicist turn in the history of philosophy and its connections to theology and Scripture, showing that the science and religion concept derives from philosophy's earlier tension with theology as it became an academic discipline centered in the medieval, then research university, with the centrality of (...) Scripture changing under the influence of historical criticism. Looking at Thomas Aquinas and Friedrich Schleiermacher on theology and Scripture's connection to science, it offers a new framework for theorizing science and religion as part of the history of philosophy. (shrink)

Frank Kermode is one of our most distinguished and beloved critics of English literature. Here, he contributes a new epilogue to his collection of classic lectures on the relationship of fiction to age-old concepts of apocalyptic chaos and crisis. Prompted by the approach of the millennium, he revisits the book which brings his highly concentrated insights to bear on some of the most unyielding philosophical and aesthetic enigmas. Examining the works of writers from Plato to William Burrows, Kermode shows how (...) they have persistently imposed their "fictions" upon the face of eternity and how these have reflected the apocalyptic spirit. Kermode then discusses literature at a time when new fictive explanations, as used by Spenser and Shakespeare, were being devised to fit a world of uncertain beginning and end. He goes on to deal perceptively with modern literaturewith "traditionalists" such as Yeats, Eliot, and Joyce, as well as contemporary "schismatics," the French "new novelists," and such seminal figures as Jean-Paul Sartre and Samuel Beckett. Whether weighing the difference between modern and earlier modes of apocalyptic thought, considering the degeneration of fiction into myth, or commenting on the vogue of the Absurd, Kermode is distinctly lucid, persuasive, witty, and prodigal of ideas. (shrink)

As concern over the use of questionable research practices in academic science has increased over the last couple of decades, some reforms have been implemented and many others have been debated and recommended. While many of these proposals have merit, efforts to improve scientific practices are more likely to succeed when they are responsive to the prevailing views and concerns of scientists themselves. To date, there have been few efforts to solicit wide-ranging input from researchers on the topic of needed (...) reforms. This article is a qualitative report of responses from federally funded scientists to the question of what should be done to address the problem of QRPs in their disciplines. Overall, participants were concerned about how institutional and career-oriented incentives encourage the use of QRPs. Compared to previous recommendations, participants had surprisingly little confidence in the ability of ethics training to improve research integrity. (shrink)

This study identifies and explores evolving concepts of trust and privacy in the context of user-generated health data. We define “user-generated health data” as data captured through devices or software and used outside of traditional clinical settings for tracking personal health data. The investigators conducted qualitative research through semistructured interviews with researchers, health technology start-up companies, and members of the general public to inquire why and how they interact with and understand the value of user-generated health data. We found significant (...) results concerning new attitudes toward trust, privacy, and sharing of health data outside of clinical settings that conflict with regulations governing health data within clinical settings. Members of the general public expressed little concern about sharing health data with the companies that sold the devices or apps they used, and indicated that they rarely read the “terms and conditions” detailing how their data may be exploited by the company or third-party affiliates before consenting to them. In contrast, interviews with researchers revealed significant resistance among potential research participants to sharing their user-generated health data for purposes of scientific study. The widespread rhetoric of personalization and social sharing in “user-generated culture” appears to facilitate an understanding of user-generated health data that deemphasizes the risk of exploitation in favor of loosely defined benefits to individual and social well-being. We recommend clarification and greater transparency of regulations governing data sharing related to health. (shrink)

This book attracted attention on first publication under the title of "Capitalism and the Permissive Society" as a spirited defence of capitalism aimed at radicals who valued personal liberty above conformity and authority. It is, if anything, of even greater relevance today now that the political debate centres more on the uses and abuses of both the market and government inter-vention. In this new edition, the author discusses the latest developments in the world of ideas and events. His verdict on (...) recent experiments such as Reaganism and Thatcherism and liberal attempts to revive socialism will be of great interest. (shrink)